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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) since this appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals on July 21, 2004. R. at 117. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative of the 
appeal: 
1. U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." 
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2. UTAH CONST., art. I, § 22. 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private 
property without compensation 
"(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, 
immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery 
of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental 
entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation. . . . " 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents -
Service - Legal disability - Appointment of guardian ad litem 
"(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claims is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
(b) The notice shall be 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's 
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against 
an incorporated city or town.. . ." 
5. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its 
employee - Time for filing notice. 
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"A claim against a political subdivision or its employees for an act or 
omission occurring during the course of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim 
arises . . . . " 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("Immunity Act"), before a party can 
bring a claim against any governmental entity, including a municipality, the party must 
direct or deliver a written notice of claim with the entity. If a party is bringing a claim 
against a municipality, the notice of claim must be directed to the city recorder. Failure to 
properly file a notice of claim bars the plaintiff from bringing the claim against the entity. 
The district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs state law claims for failure 
to comply with the Immunity Act. The Plaintiff failed to file any notice of claim to the 
Holladay City Recorder. Furthermore, pursuant to the Immunity Act, Plaintiff had until 
December 17, 2003 to file such notice. As the one-year period for compliance with the 
notice requirement expired on December 17, 2003, there can be no cure of the 
jurisdictional defect now or in the future. Thus, this Court should affirm the district 
court's dismissal of Plaintiff s state law claims. 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have clearly held 
that a Fifth Amendment takings claim does not exist until the plaintiff has availed 
themselves and been denied just compensation via a state law inverse condemnation 
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claim. The district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs federal takings claims for 
lack of ripeness because Plaintiff has not yet availed itself and been denied just 
compensation in a state law inverse condemnation action. Thus, this Court should affirm 
the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff s federal claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Was Correct in Dismissing Plaintiffs State Takings 
Claim For Failure to Comply With the Notice-of-Claim Requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
Pursuant to Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1, et 
seq. ("the Immunity Act"), proper notice of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any 
damages action against a political subdivision such as Holladay City: 
A claim against a political subdivision or its employees for an act or 
omission occurring during the course of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice 
of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after 
the claim arises. . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added); see also Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 
632, 636-37 (Utah 2002). The Immunity Act provides that a notice of claim shall be 
"directed and delivered to . . . the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A). 
Utah Courts have consistently held that the Immunity Act's notice requirements 
are to be strictly construed and enforced. See e.g. Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 
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1287, 1289 (Utah 2003) ("court has long required strict compliance"); Bellonio v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294,1297 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("Utah Courts have typically 
required strict compliance with the notice of claim requirements.. . ."); Bischel v. Merritt, 
907 P.2d 275, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Utah Courts have established a rule of strict 
compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act."). 
Neither actual notice to the appropriate city official nor other reasonably strict compliance 
is sufficient. See Gurule, 69 P.3d at 1289. In fact, any deviance from the clear and 
unambiguous requirements set forth in § 63-30-11 will bar a plaintiffs claim against a 
governmental entity. See Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1296 (failure to strictly comply with the 
notice requirements of § 63-30-11 barred claim against a city). 
Here, the incident constituting the City's final rejection of the Plaintiffs proposal 
giving rise to Plaintiffs claim occurred on December 17, 2002. See Complaint, R. at 7, 
and 25-29. The purported notice of claim provided by the Plaintiff on January 22, 2003, 
was directed and delivered to then-Mayor Larkin, not to the City Recorder. See Exhibit 
B, R. at 30. The Plaintiffs failed to "direct or deliver" any notice of claim to Holladay 
City Recorder Jerry Medina or his successor, Deputy Holladay City Recorder Stephanie 
Carlson, on or before the December 17, 2003, deadline for such notice. 
It is clear that the Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the Immunity Act's notice 
requirements, which deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, as 
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the one-year period for compliance with the notice requirements expired on December 17, 
2003, there can be no cure of the jurisdictional defect now or in the future. Under these 
circumstances, the only appropriate course of action was the dismissal of the Plaintiffs 
claims with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gurule, 69 P.3d at 1289 
("trial court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction"); 
Wheeler, 40 P.3d at 638 ("we affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' suit for 
lack of jurisdiction"). 
The Plaintiffs first argument is that Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-
executing and is not subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1 Aplt. Brief at 10. 
In support of their argument, Plaintiff cites to Coleman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 
622 (Utah 1990). Coleman, however, is distinguishable from the present case.2 A 
reading of Coleman shows that the issue was not the procedural requirements of the 
Immunity Act, but rather the substantive immunity given to government entities under the 
Immunity Act. The Utah Supreme Court held in Coleman that under Article 1, § 22, 
government entities were not immune from a takings claim. Id, at 635. The Court did not 
!The fact that a constitutional provision is self-executing has no bearing on 
whether that provision is subject to the Immunity Act. Rather, if a constitutional 
provision is self-executing, it simply means the provision "is one that can be judicially 
enforced without implementing legislation." Spackman ex rel Spackman, 16 P.3d at 535. 
2This is likely the reason why the lower court's memorandum decision does not 
mention Coleman, See Aplt. Brief at 13. 
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hold that a plaintiff bringing a state takings claim was exempt from the notice 
requirement under § 63-30-11. All of the other cases Plaintiffs cite in support of their 
argument, Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990), Farmers New World 
Life Ins, Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990), Bateman v. City of West 
Bountiful 89 F.3d 704 (10th Cir. 1996) and Spackman v. Board of Education, 16 P.3d 
533 (Utah 2000) also deal with substantive immunity under UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-
10.5 rather than the procedural requirements under the Immunity Act. 
While the Plaintiff may ponder why Pig's Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 
P.3d 379 (Utah 2002), does not address Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1990), the answer is quite simple. Colman and its progeny, as explained above, 
examined substantive sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act and Article I, Section 
22. Pig's Gun Club examined the procedural requirements of the Act's notice 
provisions. As determined by the Utah Court of Appeals in Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 
130 (Utah App. 1994) the substantive immunity provisions of the act are separate and 
independent from the procedural notice provisions and are entitled to a separate analysis. 
The "limitations" examined by Colman and the other prt-Pig's Gun Club cases cited by 
the Plaintiffs clearly address only the substantive sovereign immunity otherwise granted 
by the Act. 
The other post-Pig's Gun Club cases cited by the Plaintiff are equally irrelevant. 
10 
In Security Investment Ltd. v. Brown, 47 P.3d 97 (Utah 2002), the Court disagreed with 
the plaintiffs' premise that their claims arose under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution and accordingly never reached the notice issue. Id. at 100. The quoted 
portion of B.AM Dev., L.L.C v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 
represents a footnote to the dissenting opinion that does not address the notice 
requirement at all but again refers to the substantive sovereign immunity analysis 
contained in Colman, supra. 
Pig's Gun Club, supra, conclusively establishes that the notice requirement of the 
Act applies to state law taking claims. The Plaintiff has failed to comply with that notice 
requirement and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs state law 
claims. See Security Investment, Ltd., 47 P.3d at 101. 
Plaintiff argues that the City of Holladay's distinction between substantive 
immunity and the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act "appears to be without 
support when viewed in the broader context of takings law." Aplt. Brief at 14. In support 
of its argument, Plaintiff states that the Utah Supreme Court in Coleman and Pigs Gun 
Club did not draw such a distinction. Aplt. Brief at 14. Plaintiffs argument is 
unconvincing because the issue in Coleman was on substantive immunity, that is, whether 
the defendants were immune from liability, not on whether the plaintiff complied with the 
procedural requirements of the Immunity Act. Coleman, 795 P.2d at 630. Thus, the court 
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did not need to examine the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act. In Pigs Gun 
Club, since the Utah Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs notice of claim was 
deficient, it needed not to address whether the defendants were immune from suit. Pigs 
Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002). The final reason given 
by Plaintiff against the distinction between substantive immunity and the procedural 
requirements of the Immunity Act is that the "only case which discusses the term 
'substantive immunity' co-extensively with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is 
Nielson v. Gurleyr Aplt. Brief at 14. In Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. 
App, 1994), the Court of Appeals found that the notice requirements of the Act 
constituted a separate and independent ground of protection to governmental defendants 
even in cases where immunity had been waived as to the underlying claim. The Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[Nielson] confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the extent of 
substantive sovereign immunity protection. Complying with the notice 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional 
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with 
the substantive provisions contained within the Governmental Immunity 
Act which insulate the sovereign and its operatives from liability. If, as 
Nielson argues, a plaintiff need only provide notice in those situations when 
the sovereign may properly invoke immunity under the substantive 
provisions of the Act, the notice requirement would be meaningless because 
the substantive provisions of sovereign immunity would fully protect the 
sovereign and its operatives in any event. 
Id. at 135 (footnote and internal citations omitted, emphasis added). As Nielson makes 
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clear, the notice requirement is a separate and independent provision of the Act that must 
be complied with even in cases where there is no substantive immunity as a matter of 
waiver or otherwise. While this may be the only case that uses the phrase "substantive 
sovereign immunity" when speaking of the Immunity Act, other courts have found that 
the notice requirement is a precondition to suit and is separate analysis from the immunity 
provisions of the Immunity Act. See e.g, Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 
1988) (holding that "because the plaintiffs . . . did not give the required notice and 
therefore failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of their claim"). 
Furthermore, separate application of the notice requirement makes sense in light of 
the independent purpose that it serves. "The purpose of a notice of claim is to provide the 
governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, 
evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litig2ition." Pig's 
Gun Club, 42 P.3d at 382 (internal quotation omitted). In light of the clear statutory and 
case law on this subject, their can be no dispute that the notice requirement of the Act 
applies to all claims against governmental entities regardless of whether substantive 
immunity has been waived for the claims asserted. The Defendants were accordingly 
entitled, at the minimum, to dismissal of all of the Plaintiffs state law claims for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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Additional evidence that before bringing a state takings claim a plaintiff must 
comply with the notice requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11 is found in a 
comparison of § 63-30-5 and § 63-30-10.5. Section 63-30-5 waives immunity for claims 
arising from "contractual rights or obligations" and provides that such claims are not 
subject to the notice requirements of § 63-30-11. In contrast, while § 63-30-10.5 provides 
a waiver of immunity for state takings claims, the section does not provide that such 
claims are not subject to the notice requirements of § 63-30-11. If the legislature would 
have intended that state takings claims were exempt from the notice requirements of § 63-
30-11, they would have so provided as they did in § 63-30-5. 
In conclusion, the notice requirements of § 63-30-11 apply to Article I, § 22 of the 
Utah Constitution. Failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Immunity Act 
deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, because Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the notice requirement under § 63-30-11, its state law claims 
against Holladay City are barred and were correctly dismissed. 
II. The District Court was Correct in Dismissing Plaintiffs § 1983 Takings 
Claim Against Holladay City for Lack of Ripeness 
"The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes 
taking without just compensation." Williamson Planning Comm yn v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172, 194 (1985). "Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be 
paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a 
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reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation exist at the time of 
the taking." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). "If the government has 
provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process 
"yield[s] just compensation," then the property owner "has no claim against the 
Government" for a taking." Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1013, 1018, n.21, (1984)). The Court noted that "because the Constitution does not 
require pretaking compensation, and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate 
provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State's action . . . is not 
'complete' until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking." Id. at 
195. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court held that "if a State provides an 
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a 
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied 
just compensation." Id. 
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Utah residents are 
not permitted to assert federal takings claims without first availing themselves of an 
inverse condemnation action under state law. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Fork City, 
2003 UT 7, f 35, 67 P.3d 466, 476-77 (citing Williamson, All U.S. at 194) (the Court 
held that plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim was unripe because the plaintiffs had not 
availed themselves of the state inverse condemnation procedure); see also BAM. Dev., 
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LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 721, n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that 
under Utah law, "[t]he inverse condemnation action is available to any landowner who 
suffers destruction or impairment of a protected private property right.")- Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs purported § 1983 claim simply does not exist until the Plaintiff has been denied 
just compensation in a state law inverse condemnation action. Because Plaintiffs have yet 
to be denied just compensation in a state law inverse condemnation action, Plaintiffs § 
1983 takings claim must be dismissed for lack of ripeness. 
Plaintiff admits that as a result of Williamson "federal courts now routinely dismiss 
federal takings claims and require plaintiffs to litigate state inverse condemnation claims 
in state court first." Aplt. Brief at 15. However, Plaintiff attempts to get around clear 
U.S. Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit and Utah Supreme Court case law by arguing that this 
Court should not adopt a literal interpretation of Williamson because to do so would 
preclude the Plaintiff from litigating its § 1983 takings claim since once it "has litigated 
state inverse condemnation claims in state court, any subsequent attempt to litigate federal 
takings claims in federal court is precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel." Aplt. Brief at 16. Plaintiff asserts that "courts have been notably 
resistant to an interpretation of Williamson that precludes state courts as a proper initial 
venue for federal takings claims," and then asks this Court to find as other courts have 
that "the proper, and only, venue, following Williamson, for raising federal takings claims 
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is in state court." Id, Plaintiffs argument must be rejected because first, Williamson is 
unambiguous in its holding that a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe before a 
plaintiff has sought and been denied just compensation via a state law inverse 
condemnation proceeding, and second, there is binding precedent that supports the 
Defendant's and the lower court's interpretation of Williamson. 
In Williamson, the United States Supreme Court held that "if a State provides an 
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a 
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied 
just compensation." 473 U.S. at 194. In so holding, the Supreme Court in Williamson did 
not draw a distinction between asserting a Fifth Amendment claim in federal court and 
asserting a Fifth Amendment claim in state court. For example, the Court did not say that 
a property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause in federal 
court until it has availed itself and been denied just compensation via a state court 
proceeding. Still, Plaintiff wants to interpret Williamson as only precluding "federal 
courts as an initial venue for litigating federal takings claims" and allowing federal 
takings claims to be brought initially in state court. Aplt. Brief at 15. However, 
Plaintiffs interpretation of Williamson contradicts the clear wording of the opinion. In 
Williamson the Supreme Court clearly stated that a plaintiff who has not availed itself of a 
state procedure for seeking just compensation and been denied cannot assert a Fifth 
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Amendment claim irrespective if it is initially brought in state of federal court. 
Case law supports the Defendant's and the lower court's interpretation of 
Williamson. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Miller v. Campbell County v. United 
States, 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991), held that "[i]n those states that allow aggrieved 
property owners to bring an inverse condemnation action in order to recover 
compensation for property taken by the state, a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe 
until the aggrieved property owner has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation" (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit did not draw a distinction as to what 
court, either federal or state, a plaintiff was precluded from asserting a Fifth Amendment 
claim, but simply stated that until the plaintiff has used the state court procedure and been 
denied just compensation could the plaintiff allege a Fifth Amendment takings claim. 
Plaintiff asserts that "Utah state courts have not had the opportunity to fully 
explore this issue and provide a definitive opinion." Aplt. Brief at 15. Plaintiffs 
assertion is unfounded because the State's highest court has recently interpreted 
Williamson in a manner consistent with the lower court's judgment that is binding upon 
this Court. Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003).3 In Patterson, 
3This Court is bound to follow Utah Supreme Court precedent. See State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, n.3 (Utah 1994) (explaining the Utah Court of Appeal's duty 
to strictly adhere to Utah Supreme Court precedent, pursuant to the doctrine of stare 
decisis). 
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several real estate developers brought a § 1983 claim against American Fork in which 
they asserted a deprivation of their Fifth Amendment rights based on the city's refusal to 
permit development at certain locations. Id. at 468-70. However, the real estate 
developers had failed to utilize a state law takings claim prior to asserting their federal 
claims. Id. at 477. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court, citing Williamson, dismissed 
the developers' federal claims on the grounds that they were not ripe: 
We also find that the trial court was correct to dismiss 
Pattersons' Fifth Amendment takings claim. The Supreme 
Court has held that "[i]f the government has provided an 
adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to 
that process '[yields] just compensation,' then the property 
owner 'has no claim against the Government for a taking." 
[citation to cases omitted] In Utah, the appropriate post-
taking remedy is an inverse condemnation action, and 
Pattersons have not utilized that remedy. "Unless and until 
plaintiffs avail themselves of [the inverse condemnation] 
remedy, their takings claim will remain unripe." [citation 
omitted] 
Id at 476-77 (alterations to quotations in original). The State's highest court interpreted 
Williamson in accordance with the Defendant's and the lower court's interpretation of 
Williamson. What Plaintiff asks is for this Court to overrule last years Supreme Court 
decision. However, this Court must follow binding precedent and interpret Williamson 
likewise by holding that Plaintiffs failure to use and be denied just compensation via a 
state law inverse condemnation proceeding bars Plaintiffs § 1983 Takings Claim. 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Patterson from the present case by asserting that in 
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Patterson "the court dismissed plaintiffs federal takings claims because plaintiffs, unlike 
Heughs Land, had not availed themselves of a state inverse condemnation remedies." 
Aplt. Brief at 15. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the present case from Patterson is 
unpersuasive because while the plaintiff in Patterson may have failed to utilize a state 
inverse condemnation action, the Plaintiff in this case has not yet been denied just 
compensation in a state inverse condemnation action, and both are required under 
Williamson in order for a federal takings claim to be ripe. 
Furthermore, the lack of ripeness of Plaintiff s § 1983 takings claim does not work 
any particular injustice on the Plaintiff or any other potential takings claimant. The 
Plaintiff has never been denied a forum or an opportunity to vindicate its property rights 
under the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to fully 
and fairly litigate its right to compensation by properly bringing a state law inverse 
condemnation claim. This full and fair litigation would likely have completely redressed 
any violation of the Plaintiffs federal rights, but it cannot now occur due to the Plaintiffs 
own failure to comply with state law procedural requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs state and federal claims. 
First, Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
30-11 by not directing or delivering to the Holladay City Recorder a Notice of Claim. 
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Failure to comply with the notice requirements of the immunity act is an absolute bar to 
suite. Thus, the lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs Art. I, § 22 takings 
claim. Finally, Plaintiffs § 1983 takings claim is unripe because Plaintiff has not yet 
availed itself and been denied just compensation via a state law inverse condemnation 
proceeding. Therefore, the lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs § 1983 
takings claim. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to uphold the 
lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff s claims in their entirety. 
DATED this ££ day of December, 2004. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
PE^E^STIRBA 
GREGORY P. NIELSEN 
Attorneys for City of Holladay 
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